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The Report of the Pre~ident's Cabinet Committee 
on Private Pension Plan Regulation: 
An Appraisal 
The growth of private employee pension plans in the American 
economy is astonishing. From 1953 to the end of 1964, the accumu-
lation of assets of private pension funds has grown from 16.9 billion 
dollars to 75 billion dollars, with a projected accumulation of 225 
billion dollars by 1980.1 At present, private retirement plans cover 
approximately 25 million workers, which is one-half of all employees 
in private non-farm establishments.2 Moreover, unions increasingly 
stress both the creation of pension plans where none exist and in-
creased benefits from current plans. Thus, during the recent United 
Auto Workers negotiations the union sought and received extensive 
increases in benefit payments.3 Finally, unions are also attempting to 
establish pooled joint retirement funds where smaller companies are 
involved, thereby permitting employers who previously could not 
afford to maintain funds to provide pension benefits for their em-
ployees. 4 
Numerous factors have contributed to pension plan growth. 
During and since World War II, high corporate taxes coupled with 
a deduction allowance for contributions to pension plans have per-
mitted pension plan establishment and maintenance at a relatively 
low net cost to the employer.5 In addition, in 1948, Inland Steel Co. 
v. NLRB6 held that welfare and pension matters were bargainable 
issues, giving impetus to the labor drive to obtain extensive em-
ployee security programs. Perhaps most important (albeit difficult 
to substantiate) has been a growing demand by workers for economic 
security during retirement. Private pension plans have filled this de-
mand for a substantial part of the work force; coupled with Social 
Security benefits, private pension benefits may well provide adequate 
retirement incomes for those covered. 7 
1. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OrnER PRIVATE RETIRE· 
MENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS-
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS xiv Gan. 29, 1965) 
(hereinafter cited as CABINET COMM. REPORT); U.S. News &: World Report, June 17, 
1963, p. 106. 
2. CABINET COMM. REPORT 2. 
3. At Chrysler, retirement income is now $4.25 a month per year of credited service, 
up from $2.80 under the old contract. 
4. Wall Street J., Oct. 27, 1964, p. 1, col. 6. 
5. This is only one of several reasons for the extensive growth of pension plans 
suggested by the Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds of the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, Final Report on Welfare and Pension Plan 
Investigation, S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1956) (hereinafter cited as the 
DOUGLAS REPORT). 
6. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). 
7. See 58 LAB. REL. REP. 11 153 (Feb. 22, 1965). 
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As private retirement plans have grown in number and impor-
tance, so has federal legislation regulating their use. Neve:rtheless, 
considering the economic and social importance of pension plans, the 
degree of federal regulation is and has been minimal. This predom-
inantly laissez-faire attitude may be on the wane, however. In 1962 
President Kennedy established a Cabinet Committee to review pen-
sion plan growth and behavior and to make recommendations for 
further federal control;8 on January 29, 1965, President Johnson re-
leased the final report of this Cabinet Committee. The report con-
tains recommendations which suggest fairly extensive federal regu-
lation of several aspects of pension planning and administration. 
I. PRESENT FEDERAL9 REGULATION OF PENSION PLANS 
To realize the significance of the Committee's proposals, it is 
necessary to understand the scope of existing legislation. The most 
important extant legislation is the Welfare and Pension Plans Dis-
closure Act.10 Because of the continued growth of welfare and pen-
8. The Chairman of the Committee was Secretary of Labor Wirtz and members 
were the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the 
Director of the Budget Bureau, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, and the Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission. 
9. Section 16 of the amended Disclosure Act provides that nothing in the act should 
be construed as preventing any state from obtaining additional information (beyond 
that required by the Disclosure Act) on welfare and pension plans or from otherwise 
regulating such plans, 76 Stat. 38 (1958), 29 U.S.C. § 309 (1958). Although the Dis-
closure Act allows the states to regulate pension plans as they choose, at present 
legislation exists only in the form of reporting and disclosure and only five states have 
this type of legislation: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, 'Washington, and 
Wisconsin. Although the states have chosen not to regulate pension plan activity, 
several authorities insist that .the states are best equipped to deal with the problem of 
pension plan regulation due to the availability of state administrative machinery and 
their proximity to the operations of the funds. See, e.g., Vladeck, Public Regulation of 
Pension Plans, N.Y.U. !Orn ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 148, 155 (1957). 
10. 72 Stat. 997 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (Supp. V, 1964). The Labor 
Management Relations Act § 302, 61 Stat. 157 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 186 
(Supp. V, 1964) contains minor regulation of welfare and pension plan activity. Sec-
tion 302 is a general prohibition against payment of money or other things of value 
by an employer to a representative of its employees or a labor organization representing 
its employees. One of several exceptions to this general prohibition is payment to trust 
funds established by a representative of the employees, § 302(c)(5). However, the plan 
must fulfill the following requirements before it is exempt from the general prohibi-
tion: the sole purpose of the trust must be to benefit employees of the employer or 
their dependents, the basis on which payments are to be made must be specified in a 
written agreement, the employees and employer must have equal representation in the 
administration of the funds, there must be an annual audit of the funds available for 
inspection at the principal office of the trust fund, and payments intended to be used 
for pensions and annuities must be made a separate fund and cannot be used for any 
other purpose. The act proved to be totally ineffectual with respect to welfare and 
pension plan regulation and disclosure. Since the act covers only funds passing from 
the employer to the employee representative or union, most plans are not covered by 
the act. Nearly all plans are unilaterally instituted by employers or unions. Even if the 
plan were within the purview of § 302{c)(5), there is no penalty for maladministration 
of the funds, no prohibition of administrative committees paying themselves excessive 
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sion plans throughout the 1950's and because of evidence uncovered 
by congressional investigations of looting and mishandling of pen-
sion funds, it became apparent that legislation was necessary to pro-
tect the equities of participating employees.11 In 1958, Congress con-
cluded that the best way to attack these abuses was by reporting and 
disclosure of administrative information to interested parties.12 
However, the 1958 Act proved to be ineffectual. Because the act re-
quired only limited reporting of fund administration and failed to 
provide the Secretary of Labor with enforcement or investigative 
powers, its effectiveness was determined solely by the self-policing 
and self-appraisal of plan beneficiaries.13 Because of this lack of 
salaries, no safeguard against other forms of self-dealing by the committee, and no 
remedy for abuse of trust purposes. The annual report requirement is also ineffectual 
because the act fails to specify the information to be included in the report; the usual 
report is not sufficiently detailed to disclose the nature of the fund's disbursements. 
In addition, the reports were not given the wide distribution essential for effective dis-
closure; the act requires only availability at the plan's principal office. 
The Disclosure Act provides criminal sanctions for violation of its provisions. In 
1958, Congress added several new sections to the Federal Criminal Code making 
explicitly illegal theft or embezzlement from employee benefit plans, knowingly making 
false statements or concealing facts in relation to documents required by the Welfare 
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, and receipt or offering of kickbacks, gifts or com-
missions for influencing a plan's actions. Penalty for convictions is a $10,000 ma.ximum 
fine, a maximum of three or five years imprisonment (depending on the offense), or 
both the fine and imprisonment. The maximum imprisonment for embezzlement or 
theft of funds and for false statements or concealment of facts is five years; for receipt 
or offering of kickbacks, gifts or commissions it is three years. Embezzlement and theft 
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 664 (Supp. V, 1964); making false statements and concealing 
facts, 18 U.S.C. § 1027 (Supp. V, 1964); receipt or offering of kickbacks, gifts or com-
missions, 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (Supp. V, 1964). One of the problems in the concept and 
administration of the Disclosure Act is that the reported and disclosed information 
never reaches participants of the plan unless they themselves expend effort to get 
the annual report. Even then, most employees probably could not interpret the reported 
information. Section 10 of the Disclosure Act allows the Secretary of Labor to publish 
any information or data contained in plan descriptions and annual reports where it 
would protect the interests of plan participants. To a certain extent, this facilitates 
the dissemination of the information, but the decision to publish is made by the 
Secretary of Labor and not by interested parties. Even with the amendment, an 
employee would have to be highly motivated to inspect the administration of his 
pension plan before the information would come to his attention. 
II. S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 11 (1958). Some of the worst abuses 
involved the following insurance practices: exorbitantly high commissions paid to 
individual agents in order to acquire adoption of the particular plan over which the 
agent had control; excessive administrative fees; unequal treatment of policyholders; 
placing the interests of policyholders above those of the beneficiaries; and activities of 
unscrupulous brokers and agents including embezzlement of premiums, sometimes in 
collusion with union or management officials. 
12. DOUGLAS REPORT 8; H.R. REP. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958). 
13. Under §§ 9(b) and (d) of the 1958 Act, plan participants could sue to enjoin 
violations of § 8, the publication provision, in the federal district courts or could sue 
any administrator of a plan for damages who failed or refused, upon written request 
of a participant, to make publication to him within 30 days of the request. Damages 
were $50 a day from the date of failure or refusal. From 1958 to 1962, however, even 
in light of the evidence of extensive looting and mishandling of funds prior to 1958 
and of the failure of many plan administrators to file required reports with the 
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power, it is not surprising that at least one-third of those adminis-
trators required to file descriptions and reports failed to do so.14 
In 1962, important amendments15 to the act became effective, and 
it is in this amended form that the Disclosure Act exists today. The 
basic reporting and disclosure concepts of the act were not changed. 
However, the Secretary of Labor was given the powers essential for 
producing compliance with the act: authority to conduct investiga-
tions, subpoena witnesses and records, and bring suit in the federal 
district courts to enjoin temporarily or permanently actions viola-
tive of the act.16 Although the Disclosure Act is considerably 
strengthened by these amendments, it remains only a device for elic-
iting information. Consequently, the question of whether some form 
of positive regulation is needed, whether there still exist more subtle 
but equally destructive threats to the security of participating em-
ployees, 17 remains. 
The only present regulation of the scope and administration of 
private pension plans is found in the Internal Revenue Code. While 
the threat of criminal prosecution provides the deterrent against vi-
olation of the Disclosure Act, the enforcement arm of the Code lies 
in the power of the Internal Revenue Service to grant or disallow 
the "qualified" status of a pension plan. Qualification of a pension 
plan is usually highly desirable because it provides extensive tax ad-
vantages to both the employer-trustor and the employee-beneficiary: 
employers' contributions are deductible as ordinary and necessary 
business expenses;18 employer contributions are not taxable as part 
of the employees' gross income in the taxable year where paid into 
the fund but rather are taxed when the employee receives the bene-
fits, which usually occurs after retirement when an employee's tax 
rate is lower;19 and, finally, any income earned by a "qualified" trust 
is exempt from tax to the trust.20 
Secretary of Labor, apparently only one such suit was brought by plan participants. 
BNA, FEDERAL-STATE REGULATION OF WELFARE FUNDS 28 (1962). 
14. McConnell, Recent Developments in the Planning and Administration of 
Health and Welfare Plans, N.Y.U. 14TH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 351, 360 (1961). In 
recommending possible amendments to the 1958 Act, Secretary of Labor Mitchell 
stated: "Although it is not possible to state precisely the ,magnitude of under-reporting, 
it does not appear unreasonable to believe that it would run into the thousands." CCH 
LABOR WEEKLY SUMMARY No. 630, at 17 (Aug. 23, 1960). 
15. 72 Stat. 997 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (Supp. V, 1964). 
16. Disclosure Act,§ 9(d)-(f), 29 U.S.C. §§ 308(d)-(f) (Supp. V, 1964). 
17. Eight days after he praised the 1962 amendments and signed them into law, 
President Kennedy created the committee whose report has just been made public. 
Obviously, he did not envision reporting and disclosure legislation as the ultimate 
scope of federal pension plan regulation. 
18. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a), but such deduction shall not exceed five per 
cent of the compensation paid to all employees (§ 404(a)(l)(A)). 
19. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402{a)(l), 403(a)(l). 
20. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 50l(a). 
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To merit these tax advantages a plan must meet several specific 
requirements. First, the plan must be created and its accumulated 
funds used for the exclusive benefit of employees or their benefici-
aries,21 and no part of the corpus or income of the funds may revert 
to the employer.22 Moreover, at least seventy per cent of an employ-
er's employees with five years or more service must be included in 
the plan, or, if less than seventy per cent are participants, the eligi-
bility classification of employees must not discriminate in favor of 
employees who are officers, shareholders, or supervisors.23 Similarly, 
once the plan is in effect, there may not be discrimination in favor 
of officers, shareholders, or supervisors in determining eligibility re-
quirements, contributions, or receipt of benefits.24 
Since these are the only requirements for plan qualification, 
however, it is apparent that even the regulation of private retirement 
plans by the Revenue Code is minimal, and it merely assures that the 
plans are established and maintained for the exclusive benefit of the 
trustor's employees, that funds will properly flow to designated bene-
ficiaries, and that the employer will not use nontaxable funds as part 
of its general corporate assets or for a "key man" incentive system 
for its executive employees. All other policy decisions as to plan con-
tent and administration have been left to the company's discretion. 
II. COMMITTEE PROPOSALS 
Legislative adoption of the Cabinet Committee proposals would 
end discretion in several areas of pension planning and administra-
tion. The most significant recommendations propose federal regula-
tion of vesting,25 funding26 and investment27 practices. The Com-
mittee's justification for federal intervention is their conception of 
private pension plans as a supplement to Social Security, indirectly 
subsidized by special federal tax treatment.28 The Committee found 
that the federal government loses at least one billion dollars in reve-
nues each year because of the special treatment given qualified 
21. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4O1(a)(2). 
22. INT.'REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4O1(c)(2). 
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(3)(A) & (B). 
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4O1(a)(4). In order to determine whether the plan is 
one which should be "qualified," the IRS requires that each employer file with its 
return for the year in which it seeks a deduction for plan contributions a comprehensive 
questionnaire which reveals whether the requirements for qualification were met. 
Treas. Reg. § l.404(a)(2) (1956), as amended, T .D. 6676, 1963·2 Cm,1. BULL. 41. 
25. See text accompanying note 31 infra. 
26. See text accompanying note 43 infra. 
27. See text accompanying note 57 infra. 
28. CABINET COMM. REPORT 15. Undoubtedly, instead of relying on indirectly 
regulating pension plans through amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, the 
Committee could have recommended direct regulation of pension plan activity by 
relying on the commerce clause for constitutional basis as was done in the Disclosure 
Act. 
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plans20 and concluded that "the purpose of [these] tax concessions 
granted by the Federal Government to qualified pension plans is to 
encourage the growth of sound plans which supplement the public 
retirement security system."30 To assure the federal government of 
the soundness of the plans an<j to implement effective federal con-
trol, the Committee has recommended that the present pension plan 
qualification requirements of the Revenue Code be amended to en-
able enforcement of the proposed regulatory standards, with the con-
sequence that specific minimum vesting, funding, and investment 
criteria would have to be met in order to qualify for the tax advan-
tages. 
A. Minimum Vesting Rights 
Probably the most controversial Committee recommendation 
concerns the establishment of a minimum vesting requirement. Suc-
cinctly, a vested plan is "one in which an employee receives a benefit 
from the fund although he has not reached the full requirements of 
age or service before separating himself from the plan or the em-
ployer who established it."31 The growing popularity of vesting pro-
visions is manifest in the Bureau of Labor's statistics; in 1952 only 
twenty-five per cent of the plans studied had vesting clauses, while 
in 1963 two out of three plans studied had vesting provisions.32 
Although there is an apparent trend toward vesting of pension 
rights without government intervention, the Committee considered 
vesting to be of such importance that it did not want the decision 
of inclusion or exclusion of vesting provisions to be made by private 
parties, and consequently it proposed that inclusion of a minimum 
vesting provision be a qualification for favorable tax treatment. Spe-
cifically, as a minimum requirement, deferred graded vesting33 with 
fifty per cent vesting after fifteen years and full vesting after twenty 
years service was recommended. 34 
Two primary reasons are advanced for establishing vesting pro-
visions. One is based on what may be characterized as the union 
29. Id. at 17. 
30. Id. at 51. 
31. IiARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 53 (1959). One of three types 
of vesting provisions may be used: immediate full, deferred full, and deferred graded. 
Immediate full vesting gives the employee the right to all accrued pension benefits at 
the termination of his employment regardless of the length of employment. This type 
of vesting provision is rarely used. Deferred full vesting gives the employee a right 
to all accrued benefits after he has met specified requirements, e.g., reached age forty 
and completed ten years of service. Deferred graded vesting differs from deferred full 
vesting in that the employee acquires the right to a stipulated percentage of accrued 
benefits upon achieving specified age and service conditions but this percentage also 
increases until the employee eventually meets the maximum requirements when his 
pension becomes fully vested. 
32. BNA, LABOR POLICY AND PRAC!ICE BULLETIN TO MANAGEMENT 4 (Oct. 29, 1964). 
33. See note 31 supra. 
34. CABINET COMM. REPORT 42. 
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concept of the function and nature of pensions. Unions assert that 
employees earn the right to pensions as they work because they are 
working for a lower straight hourly wage in order to receive pension 
benefits.35 Therefore, employees should have vested rights in what 
they have earned. A second reason frequently suggested for the use 
of a vesting provision is that pension plans without vesting provi-
sions tend to impair labor mobility by tying the worker to the job 
in which he has pension credits he would lose if he leaves. On the 
other hand, management representatives attribute the existence of a 
pension plan to different purposes. As the Committee itself pointed 
out, "private retirement plans had their origins in retaining valuable 
employees, in reducing labor turnover and its attendant costs, and 
in rewarding long service."36 These business purposes behind the 
creation of pension plans are still viable today. 
Both the union and management positions have merit, and it 
seems infeasible to resolve the propriety of a minimum vesting re-
quirement by weighing the relative strengths of these two diverse 
concepts. However, when the probable practical effect of a vesting 
requirement is examined it is doubtful that the proposal would be 
either a wise or effective law. In some industrial situations, primarily 
in the so-called depressed industries, 37 the additional cost to plans 
resulting from a vesting requisite for qualification would mean 
lower benefits or reduced coverage.38 In addition, increased costs 
of a vesting provision might well discourage the establishment of 
new plans. For these reasons, the President's Advisory Committee on 
Labor-Management Policy,39 after reviewing a preliminary report 
by the Cabinet Committee, concluded that while supporting "the 
general principle of vesting in private pension plans ... it would be 
unwise to require some mimimum standard of vesting for tax ap-
proval."40 
While it might be expected that union leaders would strongly 
support a minimum vesting requirement, the views expressed by 
two prominent union officials, as Advisory Committee members, in-
dicate that this is not true. Anthony Boyle, president of the United 
35. AFL-CIO, PENSION PLANS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 19-21 (1953). 
36. CABINET COMM. REPORT 1. 
37. E.g., those industries where competitive products have seriously diluted the 
market, such as the coal mining industry, or those in which there is a continually low 
margin of profit. 
38. See note 51 infra. 
39. The Advisory Committee, composed of leaders of industry and labor, at the 
request of President Kennedy reviewed the preliminary draft of the Cabinet Com-
mittee's Report and made recommendations to the President as to how the Report 
might be improved. These suggestions were forwarded to the Cabinet Committee. 
40. Report to the President from the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-
Management Policy on the Recommendations by the Cabinet Committee on Corporate 
Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs, in CABINET 
COMM. REPORT, app. D, at 3 (hereinafter cited as REPORT, app. D). 
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Mine Workers, and David Dubinsky, president of the International 
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, voiced opinions against both 
minimum funding and vesting requirements. Dubinsky, articulating 
reasons in opposition, stated that a vesting requirement may "un-
duly burden the maintenance of existing plans or hamper the estab-
lishment of new plans, and may interfere with decisions regarding 
the allocation of resources available for pension benefits."41 It is likely 
that other union leaders, especially those representing unions serv-
ing depressed industries, will agree because of the increased cost of 
vesting coupled with the inability of a depressed industry to absorb 
this extra cost without depressing employee coverage or the level of 
benefits. In contrast, Walter Reuther, whose union serves probably 
the most prosperous industry in the country, supports the enact-
ment of a vesting requirement and suggests that only ten years of 
service be the standard for deferred vesting.42 The threat of a cut-
back in plan coverage or the level of benefits is seemingly insignifi-
cant to him and to his union since from the latest contract settle-
ment the UAW sought and received extensive increases in the level 
of benefit in addition to a provision granting full vesting of pension 
rights after ten years of service. 
Because the consequence of a minimum vesting requirement 
would be inequitably harsh on employees in some industries, 
the existence of a vesting provision should be decided at the 
bargaining table. When both parties to an agreement acknowledge 
that it is not in their best interest to include a vesting provision in 
a pension plan, there must be valid reasons for the decision, and 
this conclusion should be recognized without the discriminatory 
penalty of denial of tax advantage qualification. 
B. Minimum Funding 
Funding of pension plans is the process of accumulating, usually 
over a period of many years, assets in a pension fund which are ir-
revocably earmarked to pay benefits to plan participants in the fu-
ture.43 In an unfunded pension plan, the employer does not segre-
gate assets for payment of retirement benefits when they fall due 
but he normally does adopt a bookkeeping practice to indicate the 
accumulation of surplus for that purpose. A plan is fully funded, 
on the other hand, when the accumulated assets at all times are 
at least equal to accrued liabilities. An intermediate type of 
funding is the practice of partially funding accrued liabilities, and 
it is disagreement over the degree of partial funding sufficient to in-
41. Id. at 14. 
42. Id. at 16. 
43. Id. at 30. 
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sure reasonable security of participant benefits which generates the 
basic minimum funding controversy today. 
Accrued liabilities represent the present value of future benefits 
owing to employees. Definitionally, ac.crued liabilities are composed 
of three basic components: current service liabilities, past service 
liabilities, and liabilities from retroactive increases in the level of 
benefits, if any.44 Current service liabilities represent the present 
value of future benefits which are based on employee service per-
formed during a particular year, usually the current year. Past ser-
vice liabilities represent the present value of future benefits which 
are based on employee service performed prior to the inception of 
the plan. Upon establishment of a plan, there will no doubt be a 
number of older employees who have been with the company many 
years prior to the creation of the plan. If an employee has only a 
few remaining years of service before retirement, contributions 
by the employer calculated on the basis of this short period of 
future service will be inadequate to establish a reasonable pension. 
To rectify this result, many plans grant a credit for past service to 
these employees.45 Finally, liabilities from retroactive increases in 
the level of benefits represent the present value of future benefit 
increases which are based on employee service performed prior to 
the inception of the increase.46 
44. Current service liabilities always exist for the trustee of an active pension plan. 
On the other hand, past service liabilities and liabilities from retroactive increases in 
the level of benefits may or may not exist, depending upon the trustee's determination 
to grant the benefits giving rise to these liabilities. 
45. Of course, the more credit extended for past service, the more costly the plan 
will be. Thus, as a practical matter, limitations may be placed on how much past 
service will be acknowledged. This may be done either by denying credit for years 
of service beyond a specified number prior to the inception of the plan or by refusing 
credit for service prior to a specified age of the employee. 
46. The meaning of these terms as used in the minimum funding context may be 
clarified by an example. Assume that an employee has worked for a cpmpany since 
1945. In 1950 the company instituted a pension plan, establishing as the level of 
benefit $3.00 a month of retirement income for each completed year of service, 
including service prior to the plan's inception. At the end of 1964, the company 
retroactively raised the level of benefits to $4.00 a month of retirement income for 
each completed year of service. 
At the inception of the plan in 1950, the company had a past service liability which 
was the then present (1950) value of the right of the participant to receive $15 a month 
of pension income upon retirement (five years past service times $3.00), and represents 
that proportion of total retirement income attributable to employee service performed 
prior to the inception of the plan. Present value, of course, simply represents the 
amount which, when presently invested at a specified interest rate, will produce the 
promised amount of income at retirement. 
From 1950 to the end of 1964, the current service liability for each year would be 
t4e present value of the right to receive $3.00 a month of retirement income (one year 
of current service times $3.00), and is that portion of the employee's total retirement 
income attributable to employee service performed during the current year. 
At the end of 1964, the level of benefits was increased by .$1.00 a month retirement 
income for each completed year of service .. The increase had both a retroactive and 
prospective impact on the company's liabilities. The liability from the retroactive 
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An existing minimum funding law is incorporated in the Reve-
nue Code and requires total contributions sufficient to cover current 
service liabilities and the interest charge on other unfunded compo-
nents of accrued liabilities.47 However, this qualification standard ap-
plies only to plans in which at least one of the company's twenty-five 
highest paid employees participates. Thus, the present law is not 
directed at assuring adequate funding generally, but rather is de-
signed to prevent discrimination in favor of near-retirement-age, 
high-salaried employees by termination of the plan after the favored 
employees have received their full pension benefits, thus leaving in-
sufficient funds to pay the other participants. 
The Committee argued that the present tax law allows the em-
ployer too much discretion in selecting how to fund its accrued 
liabilities and that this flexibility may, and often does, lead to inade-
quate funding.48 The Committee concludes that if the plan is in-
adequately funded it may tum out to be an empty or only partially 
fulfilled promise of security in retirement. Consequently, the Com-
mittee recommended that, with regard to stated benefit plans49 
a minimum funding requirement for all plans which are to 
qualify for advantageous tax treatment be enacted. Specifically, full 
funding of all current service liabilities and full amortization of all 
accrued liabilities would be mandatory, and past service credits 
would have to be fully funded within thirty years from the inception 
of a new plan or, in existing plans, within thirty years from the enact-
ment of the proposed requirement. Retroactive increases in the 
level of benefits would have to be fully funded on the same basis as 
increase in the level of benefits is the present value of the right to receive $14 a month 
of retirement income (fourteen years of past service prior to the retroactive increase 
times $1.00, the increase in the level of benefits). The prospective effect will be that 
the current service liability for 1965, and subsequent years, will now be the present 
value to receive $4.00 a month of retirement income (one year of current service times 
$4.00). 
47. Treas. Reg. § l.401-4(c) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6675, 1963-2 CuM. BuLL. 151. 
48. CABINET CoMM. REPORT 50. As one commentator has suggested, many financial 
officers of companies are not concerned so much with the ultimate cost of the plan as 
with keeping current expenditures at a minimum. Hines, Split-Funding and Insurance 
Company Plans, N.Y.U. 10TH ANN. CoNF. ON LAlloR 191, 198 (1957). 
49. The stated benefit plan is one which promises the employee a specific retirement 
income ( e.g., a specific value per month times the number of years of service). A second 
type of pension plan is the fixed contribution plan. An example of such a plan would 
be a promise by the employer to contribute $.05 for every hour worked by participating 
employees. The employee benefits received would then be those which the combination 
of contributions and yield therefrom would produce. 
As to fixed contribution plans, the Committee proposed the general requirement 
that contribution commitments should be realistically related to the benefits promised 
and actually paid. As a practical matter, this suggestion has little meaning. If the 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement are dealing with a fixed contribution 
plan, both will have actuarial estimates of what level of benefits the contribution will 
provide; neither party merely speculates as to the likely benefits which will be 
forthcoming. 
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past service credits except that they would have to be fully funded 
within thirty years after the event giving rise to the liability. Finally, 
the Committee suggested there be a certification of the funding 
method of each new plan at its inception and a periodic investigation 
thereof at least every three years, both by an actuary with acceptable 
professional qualifications. 50 
The President's Advisory Committee, which rejected the vest-
ing proposal, endorsed a minimum funding requirement. There 
is, however, extensive opposition to the funding proposal, both by 
labor and management. Both labor leaders on the Advisory Com-
mittee who opposed a vesting requisite for qualification also opposed 
the funding requirement. Again, the reason postulated was the cost 
to existing plans and retardation of the creation of new plans. The 
Cabinet Committee itself admitted that the passage of the funding 
proposal might raise the cost of plans more than ten per cent or 
that the passage of both minimum vesting and funding require-
ments together might do so.51 Anthony Boyle indicated that if the 
minimum funding requirements were applied to the UMW Welfare 
and Retirement Fund, "the reserve for accrued benefits would need 
to be increased by several times or, in the alternative, benefit levels 
would need to be slashed correspondingly, although no imperative 
need is shown for either."52 David Dubinsky pointed out that plans 
which are not fully funded can nonetheless be actuarily sound, 
especially in the case of multi-employer plans where the likelihood 
of termination of such plans is remote. 53 
Management's basic criticism of the requirement is that it would 
place the employer in an economic straitjacket by taking away the 
present flexibility of funding more in good years and less in lean 
years. In the view of one actuarial consultant, pensions must be 
looked upon as part of the compensation of employees. In the use 
of other forms of compensation, such as bonuses54 and profit-shar-
ing plans,55 the employer has considerable flexibility in determining 
what its annual payroll cost will be; he therefore concludes that it is 
not reasonable to restrict the flexibility of pension costs.56 
The justification for more fully funded plans is apparent; em-
50. CABINEI' COMM. REPORT 53. 
51. Id. at CABINEI' COMM. REPORT 54. 
52. REPORT, App. D, at 13. 
53. Id. at 14. 
54. If a company ·has a profitable year there is presumably no limitation on 
employee bonuses it may grant within the limits of its profit margin and common-
law waste restrictions. 
55. Companies with a defined profit-sharing plan usually have a cost variable of 
from 30% of payroll to nothing, giving the employer extensive flexibility in deciding 
its profit-sharing cost for a given year. 58 LAB. REL. REP. 151 (Feb. 22, 1965). 
56. Robert Wishart, senior associate of George B. Buck, Consulting Actuaries, as 
part of a panel discussion of the Committee's report at the American Management 
Association's Personnel Conference. Ibid. 
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ployees should have reasonable assurance that promised retirement 
income will be forthcoming in the anticipated amount. Moreover, 
while minimum vesting would legislatively grant employees rights 
which had not been given voluntarily by employers, minimum fund-
ing would merely give employees greater assurance of benefits al-
ready promised. As with minimum vesting of pension rights, how-
ever, the question is whether the imposition of a uniform standard 
of funding is appropriate. It would seem that, in light of the state: 
ments opposing the proposal, the increase in costs to pension plans 
resulting from the minimum funding requirement would be at 
least as great as that resulting from the vesting requirement. The 
increased costs may force some employers to terminate present plans 
or lower the level of benefits, thereby eliminating or reducing the 
retirement income of participating employees. Funding levels, as 
well as vesting provisions, are more properly determined by the part-
ies to the collective bargaining agreements. To force minimum uni-
formity on all plans would be to ignore the wide diversity in ability 
of employers to fund plans at the proposed required level and still 
maintain existing benefits. 
C. Investment Regulation 
Pension trustees have nearly limitless freedom in investing the 
plan funds.';7 The Disclosure Act expressly avoids regulation of 
fund investment;58 and the tax law generally does not attempt to reg-
ulate investment of pension funds. 59 Possibly the prohibition in the 
Code against fund corpus or income reverting to or being used 
by the employer may initially serve as a restriction by prohibiting 
at least some self-dealing investment in the trustor corporation. 
However, while disclosure must be made of the reasons for invest-
ment in stock or securities of the employer,60 there is no general 
prohibition of self-dealing investment. If the Internal Revenue 
Service is satisfied that the plan is operated for the exclusive bene-
57. While restrictions on benefit plan trustee discretion may, of course, be imposed 
by the trust instrument, -most corporations allow the trustee almost complete freedom 
on the theory that greater investment discretion means a higher yield. Thus, a New 
York State Banking Department study showed that of 1,024 bank-trusteed plans 
investigated, 702 had no restriction on investment discretion. Business Week, Jan. 31, 
1959, p. 97. As one commentator declared: "If the trust fund agreement does not 
contain substantial investment restrictions, previous experience indicates that a trust 
fund can earn at least ½ to I per cent more than when it is so limited." Kearshes, 
Methods of Funding in Pension Planning-.TJie Trustee Plan, N.Y.U. !Orn: ANN. CoNF. 
ON l.AnOR 205, 214 (1957). 
58. Disclosure Act § 9(h), 29 U.S.C. § 308(h) (Supp. V, 1964). 
59. Treas. Reg. § l.401-l(b)(5)(i) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6722, 1964·1 CuM. BuLL, 
144. No specific limitations are provided in § 40l(a) with respect to investments which 
may be made by the trustees of a trust qualifying under section 40l(a). 
60. Treas. Reg. § I.40l(b)(5)(ii) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6722, 1964·1 CUM. BuLL. 
144. 
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fit of the employees, the fund will not lose its tax status.61 Moreover, 
unless there is blatent self-dealing, 62 or unless the most elementary 
investment principles are disregarded,63 the pension fund will not 
lose its "qualified" status for any investment practice. 
Recently, some financial experts anticipated that the first signifi-
cant regulation of pension plans would be in the form of restriction 
of investment discretion. 64 The reason for this belief is the growing 
tendency of administrators to move from low-yield to higher yield, 
but often more speculative, investments. Ten years ago, generally ac-
cepted principles of pension fund investment were maintenance of 
the safety of principle, assurance of yield, and liquidity of funds, ms 
and government bonds were the focal investment of all plans. 
However, from 1951 to 1963, common stock investments increased 
from 11.4 per cent to over 41 per cent.66 Perhaps the most influential 
single reason for this change in investment practice is the growing 
cost of pension plans. If trustees can raise the rate of return on plan 
investments, the employer may provide existing pension benefits 
with smaller contributions. Additional reasons include arr extensive 
confidence in the stability of the stock market and the belief that 
common stocks and real estate investments act as a curb against 
loss of principle through inflation.67 
Although the danger attending high-yield investments is the 
presumably greater risk of losses, there is no evidence available 
which indicates that greater losses have resulted. 68 Moreover, even 
61. Ibid. 
62. Under the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 503(c), a plan will lose its exemption if it 
enters into the following transactions with the employer-grantor or related or con-
trolled interests of the employer-grantor: "(I) lends any part of its income or corpus, 
without the receipt of adequate security and a reasonable rate of interest; (2) pays any 
compensation, in excess of a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation 
for personal services actually rendered; (3) makes any part of its services available on a 
preferential basis; (4) makes any substantial purchase of securities or any other 
property, for more than adequate consideration in money or money's worth; (5) sells 
any substantial part of its securities or other property, for less than adequate con-
sideration in money or money's worth; (6) engages in any other transaction which is 
a substantial diversion of its income or corpus .... " 
63. See Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CUM. BuLL. 128, 135. See generally Goodman, 
Strict Rules Limit Investment of Qualified Pension and Profit Plans, 14 J. TAXATION 
153, 154 (1961). The cost of the investment must not exceed the fair market value at 
the time of the purchase, there must be a fair return on the investment, sufficient 
liquidity must be maintained, and the safeguards that a prudent investor would look 
to must exist. As a practical matter, however, the Internal Revenue Service does not 
closely watch investment practices. 
64. Wall Street J., Oct. 27, 1964, p. 24, col. 3. 
65. P-H, PENSIONS AND PROFIT SHARING ,f 7506 (1964). 
66. HAR.BRECHT, op. cit. supra note 31, at 104; U.S. News &: World Report, June 15, 
1964, p. 103. 
67. Bernstein, Financial Aspects of Pension Funds-Problems of Investment, N.Y.U. 
10TH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 255, 261 (1957). 
68. It is not improbable that the high yield from other investments may more than 
offset increased losses if they do exist. 
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with the trend toward higher yield investments, most funds are in-
vested soundly and wisely; the large majority of common stock 
holdings are of blue chip securities.69 Nearly all funds, including 
those controlled by unions, receive expert investment advice.70 
Against this background of generally responsible and sound invest-
ment practices, the Cabinet Committee did not suggest legislation 
as significant as that proposed in the areas of vesting and funding. 
The Committee felt that because a reasonable difference of opin-
ion existed as to the proper mode of investment, conformity to a 
percentage limitation on stock investments should not be required.71 
Thus the Committee recommended only two relatively minor legis-
lative changes. First, in order to qualify for special tax treatment a 
plan may not invest more than ten per cent of its funds in the 
stock and obligations of the employing company, regardless of th_e 
ability of such an investment to meet a fiduciary test. The second 
investment proposal is an amendment to the Disclosure Act re-
quiring additional information related to a plan's investment ac-
tivity. 
Probably the strongest argument against investing in the trustor 
corporation is that it places workers' pension funds in the same com-
pany from which they draw their wages, with the consequence 
that the safety of an employee's current income and future security 
rise and fall with the fortunes of one corporation.72 Another pos-
sibly undesirable prospect resulting from extensive self-dealing 
investment is that the corporation's present directors may retain per-
petual control simply because of the investment of pension funds 
in the trustor corporation; it is the directors of the company who 
appoint the trustees, and the trustees will be likely to vote the pen-
sion plan's shares for those upon whom their positions as trustees de-
69. Business Week, Jan. 31, 1959, p. 99. 
70. Often unions invest more conservatively than corporations. For example, at 
the beginning of 1963, the Machinists Union held bonds in 26 public utilities from 
New York to California, 2500 shares of General Motors stock, 1300 of General Electric, 
1000 of IBM, 2000 of Eaton Manufacturing, and 2212 of Sears, Roebuck. The Carpenters 
Union had invested $10.9 million, $9.3 million of which was in U.S. Treasury bonds. 
U.S. News & World Report, May 27, 1963, p. 98. A possible example of speculative 
investing may be found in some aspects of the investments of the Teamsters pension 
fund. The Teamsters have invested in two large Las Vegas gambling hotels and two 
golf courses. Over one million dollars in loans from the Teamster pension and 
welfare fund went to a department store that eventually became bankrupt. 108 CONG. 
REc. 20941, 20942 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1962). Finally, recently Teamster trustees fore-
closed on a one million dollar mortgage on a Detroit hotel and on a residential 
development near Tampa. Of course, this retrospective view of these foreclosed 
mortgages may not indicate that at the time when entered into they were not sound 
investments. In addition, there is no presently available evidence of the over-all yield 
on Teamster fund investments, and perhaps the high yield on some investments more 
than cancels any losses incurred. 
71. CABINET COMM. REPORT 72. 
72. DOUGLAS REPORT 53. 
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pend-current management.73 The Committee's proposal is not 
a blanket prohibition against investment in the trustor corporation, 
but it does limit such investment to ten per cent of the funds in an 
effort to assure diversification of investments. However, the prohi-
bition suggested would destroy plans such as that instituted by Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., which has been extremely beneficial to their em-
ployees. Since there is apparently no evidence of a manifest risk 
to employee security from investment in the trustor corporation, it 
seems unwise arbitrarily to determine that these plans endanger em-
ployee security, especially when viewed in light of the success of 
some of them. Consequently, without some concrete experience and 
justification, the ten per cent limit should not be imposed on invest-
ments in the trustor corporations. 
The Disclosure Act presently lacks adequate reporting of in-
vestment activity, but the Committee's suggested amendment to the 
act would rectify this weakness. On the other hand, although the 
recommended amendment would require disclosure of self-dealing 
or highly speculative investments, pressure to change investment 
practices would still necessarily come only from participants and 
beneficiaries of the plans. It is doubtful whether such pressure would 
be forthcoming and, even if it were, whether it would deter ad-
ministrators from excessive investing in unreliable schemes.74 How-
ever, the data collected may be of great value in indicating whether, 
as well as what, regulatory measures are necessary. 
The Committee did not suggest any legislation which might cur-
tail generally irresponsible investments by trustees, but rather rec-
ommended reliance upon the present state fiduciary laws to prevent 
highly speculative investment. Under state fiduciary laws, however. 
participating employees must discover the violation and bring suit 
in their own behalf. If experience under the Disclosure Act before 
the 1962 amendments is an indication, reliance on plan participants 
to force compliance with a law is ineffectual.75 House Bill 12566, 
proposed in the fall of 1964, would amend the Disclosure Act by 
restricting fund investment to those investments permitted to be 
made by corporate or individual fiduciaries in the state in which the 
principal office of the plan is located. The amendment would give 
the Secretary of Labor the right to investigate and sue to enjoin 
violations of these state fiduciary laws. No longer would there be 
complete reliance on participating employees to force compliance. 
The Cabinet Committee felt that this proposed legislation is 
premature without more extensive examination of the effectiveness 
of the disclosure approach as a means of assuring standards of 
73. Id. at 89. 
74. See text following note 75 infra. 
75. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
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fiduciary responsibility. 76 However, while there may be a lack of 
evidence indicating a need for extensive federal regulation of in-
vestment practices, experience under the Disclosure Act seems to 
provide ample indication that those who are violating their fiduciary 
responsibility will not be deterred by disclosure legislation.77 As a 
minimum means of guarding employee retirement security against 
irresponsible investment practices, one of the federal agencies should 
be designated to assure employees that plan trustees are fulfilling 
their fiduciary obligations under existing state laws. 
Nevertheless it seems that the Cabinet Committee acted with 
appropriate restraint in refusing to recommend extensive federal 
control of pension fund investment practices. Because of the failure 
of the Disclosure Act to require detailed reporting of plan invest-
ments, evidence of any threat to the security of these funds is not 
available. The Committee wisely suggested an amendment to the 
Disclosure Act which would provide law makers with the requisite 
evidence of irresponsible investment and attendant dangers to fund 
security. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The degree of federal regulation of pension plans suggested by 
the Cabinet Committee has surprised, if not shocked, many leaders 
of both management and labor. Perhaps the most immediate effect 
of the Report will be significant repercussions at the bargaining 
table. Both sides surely have had impressed upon them the fact that 
the possibility of federal regulation is existent. Management may be 
more willing to grant vesting rights and to assure the unions of more 
complete funding. Labor, on the other hand, may consider the 
proposals to be minimum standards and refuse to stop at this mini-
mum point. 
Federal regulation seems imminent; the only question is one 
of degree. Initially it is difficult to determine whether the Report 
will or should become the legislative guideline. The Report does 
evidence, however, a willingness and actual desire of important 
government leaders extensively to restrict managerial discretion in 
the interest of increased employee security. The concept of private 
pension plans as federally subsidized supplements to Social Security 
perhaps forebodes even more extensive regulation than has been 
suggested. Hopefully, restraint will prevail, and before legislation 
is enacted clearer and more extensive evidence will be compiled 
showing the need for specific legislation. 
Thomas B. Ridgley 
76. CABINET CoMM. REPORT 79. 
77. Cf. note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
